The evolution of many economic variables is affected by expectations that economic agents have with respect to the future development of these variables. Here we show, by means of laboratory experiments, that market behavior depends to a large extent on how the realized market price responds to an increase in average price expectations. If it responds by decreasing, as in commodity markets, prices converge quickly to their equilibrium value, confirming the rational expectations hypothesis. If the realized price increases after an increase of average expectations, as is typical for financial markets, large fluctuations in realized prices are likely.
A key difference between natural and social sciences is that in social systems individual expectations or beliefs can affect the outcome. An investor buys a stock that he expects to go up in the future, a chip-manufacturer builds a new production facility because she expects that demand and therefore prices will be high after goods have been produced. Expectations determine behavior of economic agents and the actual market outcome (i.e., price and traded quantity, following from demand and supply) is an aggregation of individual behavior.
Simultaneously, economic agents form their expectations on the basis of market history.
Therefore, a market, like other social environments, has the properties of an expectations feedback system: past market behavior determines individual expectations that, in turn, determine current market behavior and so on. The structure of an expectations feedback system can be characterized as either positive or negative. In demand-driven financial markets the feedback is positive and self-confirming: if many agents expect the price of an asset to rise and therefore start buying the asset, aggregate demand will increase, and so, by the law of supply and demand, will the asset price. When a majority of investors expects markets to go down, this belief will be self-fulfilling and the market will go down. In supply-driven commodity markets the feedback is negative: if many producers expect future prices to be high they will increase production. This leads to low prices and firms will, in their disappointment, decide to decrease production only to find that they were wrong again. To investigate how expectations feedback affects aggregate market behavior we designed experimental market environments that differ only in the sign of the expectations feedback but are equivalent along all other dimensions. We compare these markets with respect to the coordination of expectations and convergence to the market equilibrium price.
The difference between positive and negative expectation feedback systems is related to the concept of, respectively, strategic complements and substitutes as introduced by John Haltiwanger and Michael Waldman (1985) . When actions are strategic complements, rational decision-makers better imitate irrational individuals. This is the case in the asset market where predicting a price close to the predictions of the other participants is most profitable. This coordination enhances the impact of the irrational participants upon the realized prices and convergence to the equilibrium price is unsure. In the negative feedback markets rational decision-makers have an incentive to predict high (low) prices when irrational individuals predict prices below (above) the equilibrium price. Here actions are strategic substitutes: the impact of irrational individuals will be limited and convergence to the equilibrium price more likely. Coordination of predictions will only take place after convergence.
Ernst Fehr and Jean-Robert Tyran (2002, 2005) report on a related experiment in which they study the adjustment of nominal prices after an anticipated money shock in a price setting game with positively (complements) or negatively sloped (substitutes) reaction curves.
They find much faster convergence in the substitute condition, in line with our results. 1 In Section I we discuss two well-known expectations feedback models from economics and set out the experimental design. Section II describes the experimental results and Section III concludes. The appendices contain a description of the experimental instructions and detailed estimation results of the individual prediction strategies.
I. Expectations Feedback and Experimental Design
The market with negative expectational feedback used in the experiment is based on the classical cobweb or hog cycle model (see Mordecai Ezekiel, 1938 , Marc Nerlove, 1958 , Richard B. Freeman, 1975 , 1976 , Gary A. Zarkin, 1985 and Paul R. Krugman, 2001 . Its key 1 Another related study concerning strategic substitutes versus strategic complements is Jan Potters and Sigrid Suetens (2005) . Their focus, however, is more on social behavior than on convergence and coordination. Cournot games and Betrand games are both social dilemma situations (the Nash equilibrium is Pareto-inefficient), but in Cournot games actions are strategic substitutes while in Bertrand games they are strategic complements. Potters and Suetens design two games with the same Nash equilibrium, the same social optimum and the same absolute (but opposite) slope of the reaction curve. They find more cooperation in the case of strategic complements than when actions are strategic substitutes. feature is a fixed production lag, so production decisions by price-taking firms are based on a forecast of the market price in the next time period. Let ( ) In the model equality between demand and supply in each period is not required, but in each period the market price is adjusted in the direction of the excess demand, the trade gap itself being absorbed by a hypothetical market maker. An increase of the price forecast leads to increasing production, a decreasing excess demand and therefore a lower market price. The following price-adjustment formula was used:
The expression between brackets represents excess demand, where the market maker uses demand in period t-1 as a proxy for demand in period t. We assume there are H suppliers, only differing in the way they form expectations. In the laboratory experiment we take H=6. The market maker adjusts the market price proportionally to the excess demand, with a positive price adjustment coefficient λ. The term ε is a random term, representing e. The two treatments are perfect symmetric opposites. One may easily check that the rational expectations equilibrium price of (2) and (4) , since the absolute value of the slope of (2) and (4) 
II. Aggregate Market Behavior and Individual Prediction Strategies
Results are shown in Figures 
Convergence of prices and coordination of expectations is demonstrated in more detail
in Figure 3 . The upper panel shows the median of the absolute difference between the market price and the equilibrium price of 60 for both treatments. We find a much higher degree of convergence to the equilibrium price in the negative feedback treatment after period two (statistically significant at 5% in 44 of the 48 periods, Wilcoxon test). Coordination of expectations is measured by the standard deviation of the individual expectations of the market participants. The lower panel shows the median over 6 or 7 markets of these standard deviations for each period. A low standard deviation implies a high level of consensus among the participants about the future price. We find that the standard deviation is higher (and therefore coordination is less) for the negative feedback treatment in the early periods 2-7
(statistically significant at 5%, Wilcoxon test). After period 7, coordination is very high in both treatments. Note that, outside of equilibrium, it pays off for participants in the negative feedback treatment to 'disagree' with the majority: if the average prediction is high, the realized price will be low. This drives the heterogeneity in predictions in the early periods and the fast convergence to the equilibrium price. In the positive feedback treatment, on the other hand, 'agreeing' with the majority pays off since the market price will be close to the average price prediction. This quick coordination of price predictions in the positive feedback treatment is surprising, since participants were not able to observe each others predictions during the experiment, making the coordination itself "blind". Individual price predictions and aggregate market prices can concisely be summarized as exhibiting "slow coordination and fast convergence" in the negative feedback treatment, and "fast coordination and slow convergence" in the positive feedback treatment.
Linear prediction rules of the form 
III. Discussion
Neo-classical economic theory assumes that people form expectations rationally (John F.
Muth 1961, Robert E. Lucas and Edward Prescott, 1972) . This implies that on average market participants make correct price forecasts and that prices quickly converge to their market clearing equilibrium values, thereby leading to an efficient allocation of resources (Eugene F. Fama, 1970 , 1991 Prices in a production market will be much more stable and closer to the equilibrium value when the product (and production technology) has been around for a while and prices can fluctuate wildly only for relatively new products (e.g. computer chips, The Economist, 1996a Economist, ,b, 2001 . The fact that some established commodity markets regularly exhibit fluctuations is consistent with our conclusions since these fluctuations may be attributed to the presence of demand-driven speculators (Paul Cashin et al. 2002, and W. Bruce Canoles et al. 1998 ). In contrast, due to the positive feedback structure, financial markets can easily diverge from the equilibrium price and be relatively unstable and excessively volatile. 
Appendix A: The Main Experimental Computer Screen
The main experimental computer screen is given in Figure "prijs" = price; "voorspelling" = prediction; "werkelijke prijs" = market price; "ronde" = round; "totale verdiensten" = total earnings; "verdiensten deze periode" = earnings this period; "Wat is uw voorspelling voor de volgende periode?" = What is your prediction for the next period?; "Een nieuwe ronde is begonnen" = A new round has started. (5)). The first column shows participants' numbers, clustered according to group; the second through eighth column show coefficient estimates; the last two columns show the R-squared statistic and report on autocorrelation in the residuals up to the 20 th order (Ljung-Box Q-statistics, 5% level Table B .3: Prediction rules for both treatments (least squares estimation of equation (6) 
Appendix C: Experimental Instructions
During each of the four experimental sessions, a short welcoming message was read aloud from paper, after which the participants were randomly assigned to a cubicle in the computer lab. In each cubicle there was a computer, some experimental instructions on paper and some blank paper with a pen. The two treatments had similar instructions that differed only in their description of the market environment. When all the participants were seated, they were asked to read the instructions on their desks. After a few minutes, they were given the opportunity to ask questions regarding the instructions, after which the experiment started. When the 50 time periods were completed, the participants were asked to remain seated and fill in the questionnaire, which was subsequently handed out to them. After a reasonable amount of time, the participants were called to the ante-room one by one to hand in the questionnaire and receive their earnings, in cash. The participants left the computer lab after receiving their earnings.
The experimental instructions the participants read in their cubicles consisted of three parts, totalling five pages. The first part contained general information about the market the experiment was about to simulate, which was of course treatment-specific. The second part contained an explanation of the computer program used during the experiment. The third part displayed a table relating the absolute prediction error made in any single period to the amount of credits earned in that period. The conversion rate between credits and euros, being 2600 credits to 1 euro, was made public by announcement, since it was not listed with the table. The questionnaire after the experiment contained 19 questions, the first 10 of which could be answered only by the integers 1 through 5. The experimental instructions will be translated below.
Translation of experimental instructions for negative feedback treatment

Experimental instructions
The shape of the artificial market used by the experiment, and the role you will have in it, will be explained in the text below. Read these instructions carefully. They continue on the backside of this sheet of paper.
General information
You are an advisor of an importer who is active on a market for a certain product. In each time period the importer needs a good prediction of the price of the product. Furthermore, the price should be predicted one period ahead, since importing the good takes some time. As the advisor of the importer you will predict the price P(t) of the product during 50 successive time periods. Your earnings during the experiment will depend on the accuracy of your predictions.
The smaller your prediction errors, the greater your earnings.
About the market
The price of the product will be determined by the law of supply and demand. The size of demand is dependent on the price. If the price goes up, demand will go down. The supply on the market is determined by the importers of the product. Higher price predictions make an importer import a higher quantity, increasing supply. There are several large importers active on this market and each of them is advised by a participant of this experiment. Total supply is largely determined by the sum of the individual supplies of these importers. Besides the large importers, a number of small importers is active on the market, creating small fluctuations in total supply.
About the price
The price is determined as follows. If total demand is larger than total supply, the price will rise. Conversely, if total supply is larger than total demand, the price will fall.
The only task of the advisors in this experiment is to predict the market price P(t) in each time period as accurately as possible. The price (and your prediction) can never become negative and always lies between 0 and 100 euros in the first period. The price and the prediction in period 2 through 50 is only required to be positive. The price will be predicted one period ahead. At the beginning of the experiment you are asked to give a prediction for period 1, V(1). When all participants have submitted their predictions for the first period, the market price P(1) for this period will be made public. Based on the prediction error in period 1, P(1) -V(1), your earnings in the first period will be calculated. Subsequently, you are asked to enter your prediction for period 2, V(2). When all participants have submitted their prediction for the second period, the market price for that period, P(2), will be made public and your earnings will be calculated, and so on, for 50 consecutive periods. The information you have to form a prediction at period t consists of: All market prices up to time period t-1: {P(t-1), P(t-2), ..., P(1)}; All your predictions up until time period t-1: {V(t-1), V(t-2), ..., V(1)}; Your total earnings at time period t-1.
About the earnings
Your earnings depend only on the accuracy of your predictions. The better you predict the price in each period, the higher will be your total earnings. The attached table lists all possible earnings.
When you are done reading the experimental instructions, you may continue reading the computer instructions, which have been placed on your desk as well.
Translation of experimental instructions for positive feedback treatment
Experimental instructions
General information
You are an advisor of a trader who is active on a market for a certain product. In each time period the trader needs to decide how many units of the product he will buy, intending to sell them again the next period. To take an optimal decision, the trader requires a good prediction of the market price in the next time period. As the advisor of the trader you will predict the price P(t) of the product during 50 successive time periods. Your earnings during the experiment will depend on the accuracy of your predictions. The smaller your prediction errors, the greater your earnings.
About the market
The price of the product will be determined by the law of supply and demand. Supply and demand on the market are determined by the traders of the product. Higher price predictions make a trader demand a higher quantity. A high price prediction makes the trader willing to buy the product, a low price prediction makes him willing to sell it. There are several large traders active on this market and each of them is advised by a participant of this experiment.
Total supply is largely determined by the sum of the individual supplies and demands of these traders. Besides the large traders, a number of small traders is active on the market, creating small fluctuations in total supply and demand.
About the price
The only task of the advisors in this experiment is to predict the market price P(t) in each time period as accurately as possible. The price (and your prediction) can never become negative and lies always between 0 and 100 euros in the first period. The price and the prediction in period 2 through 50 is only required to be positive. The price will be predicted one period ahead. At the beginning of the experiment you are asked to give a prediction for period 1, V(1). When all participants have submitted their predictions for the first period, the market price P(1) for this period will be made public. Based on the prediction error in period 1, P(1) -V(1), your earnings in the first period will be calculated. Subsequently, you are asked to enter your prediction for period 2, V(2). When all participants have submitted their prediction for the second period, the market price for that period, P(2), will be made public and your earnings will be calculated, and so on, for 50 consecutive periods. The information you have to form a prediction at period t consists of: All market prices up to time period t-1: {P(t-1), P(t-2), ..., P(1)}; All your predictions up until time period t-1: {V(t-1), V(t-2), ..., V(1)}; Your total earnings at time period t-1.
About the earnings
Translation of computer instructions
Computer instructions
The way the computer program works that will be used in the experiment, is explained in the text below. Read these instructions carefully. They continue on the backside of this sheet of paper.
The mouse does not work in this program.
Your earnings in the experiment depend on the accuracy of your predictions. A smaller prediction error in each period will result in higher earnings.
To enter your prediction you can use the numbers, the decimal point and, if necessary, the backspace key on the keyboard.
Your prediction can have two decimal numbers, for example 30.75. Pay attention not to enter a comma instead of a point. Never use the comma. Press enter if you have made your choice.
The better your prediction, the more credits you will earn. On your desk is a table listing your earnings for all possible prediction errors.
For example, your prediction was 13.42. The true market price turned out to be 12.13. This means that the prediction error is: 13.42 -12.13 ≈ 1.30. The table then says your earnings are 1255 credits (as listed in the third column [this is a typing error, it should be second column]).
The available information for predicting the price of the product in period t consists of: All product prices from the past up to period t-1; Your predictions up to period t-1; Your earnings until then.
[The caption of the figure. ]
The computer screen.
The instructions below refer to this figure.
In the upper left corner a graph will be displayed consisting of your predictions and of the true prices in each period. This graph will be updated at the end of each period.
In the rectangle in the middle left you will see information about the number of credits you have earned in the last period and the number you have earned in total. The time period is also displayed here, possibly along with other relevant information.
On the right hand side of the screen the experimental results will be displayed, that is, your predictions and the true prices for at most the last 20 periods.
At the moment of submitting your price prediction, the rectangle in the lower left side of the figure will appear. When all participants have subsequently submitted their predictions, the results for the next period will be calculated.
When everyone is ready reading the instructions, we will begin the experiment. If you have questions now or during the experiment, raise your hand. Someone will come to you for assistance.
